Bill 4675: Lack of Regulatory Consistency Between Competition Protection and Personal Data Protection
*Originally published in Jota.
**This is an AI-powered machine translation of the original text in Portuguese.
Debates are underway in Brazil about how to protect the economy and consumers and ensure technological development in digital markets. Bills on digital markets and artificial intelligence coexist with public policies promoting innovation and legislation protecting citizens’ privacy, IT security, and personal data. In this complex regulatory environment, the challenge is to ensure that interventions are coherent.
This concern is not abstract. In a previous article, we showed that the actions of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) regarding partnerships between large technology companies and artificial intelligence startups may be misaligned with the goal of developing this technology in Brazil. There is tension among the objectives of promoting competition, protecting cybersecurity, and safeguarding privacy.
In this regard, the European experience warrants attention, given the influence of its legislation on Brazilian debates in the digital sphere. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) recognizes that legislation such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which regulates competition among digital platforms, and the Digital Services Act (DSA), which regulates digital services, has implications for privacy and data protection, and emphasizes the need to promote cooperation with other regulatory authorities to safeguard these rights.
This approach led to a concrete initiative for institutional coordination. In October 2025, the EDPB and the European Commission (EC) submitted draft joint guidelines on the interplay between the DMA and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for public consultation. The document seeks to clarify how the two laws should be interpreted and applied consistently, without disregarding their respective objectives or the distinct powers of the authorities responsible for their enforcement. Among other topics, the draft addresses the conditions for combining and cross-using personal data by gatekeepers; the distribution of apps through alternative app stores and channels; data portability; requests for access to data; and data interoperability across different digital services. In all these cases, the central issue is how to ensure the effectiveness of the competition-related obligations established by the DMA without compromising the data protection requirements set out in the GDPR.
On April 28, 2026, the EDPB and the EC announced a new joint effort to develop guidelines on the relationship between European competition law and data protection legislation. The initiative aims to clarify situations in which data protection rules are relevant to competition analysis and, conversely, in which competition law may affect data protection.
In Brazil, ANPD and CADE have already recognized the need for institutional coordination. In July 2026, the authorities renewed their Technical Cooperation Agreement for another five years, providing for joint and coordinated action in situations where their powers overlap. The bodies’ institutional statements highlighted the convergence of the data protection, competition enforcement, and digital policy agendas, as well as the importance of information sharing and cooperation in assessments and investigations. This institutional recognition, however, has yet to translate into concrete and visible coordination practices in cases where competition-related measures may have significant implications for personal data protection.
One example is CADE’s proceedings against Apple, which culminated, in December 2025, in the approval of a Cease-and-Desist Agreement aimed at expanding the options for app distribution and payment processing within the iOS ecosystem. Opening the ecosystem to alternative app stores and other distribution channels raises questions that extend beyond competition to encompass device cybersecurity and user privacy. Although these risks do not eliminate the need to address potential restrictions on competition, they should form part of the assessment of the measures adopted and their safeguards.
In the context of ex ante regulation, there is still a need for a deeper discussion of regulatory coherence and the implications for information security and data protection of Bill No. 4675/2025, which is being considered under an expedited procedure in the Chamber of Deputies. Article 47-E of the bill provides that CADE may impose special obligations on designated entities, including obligations concerning interoperability, allowing the installation of third-party applications, and access to aggregated and non-aggregated data, among others. In doing so, CADE must consider features of products and services intended to ensure information security, as well as compliance with the legal and regulatory obligations applicable to the designated entity.
However, this reference to security and legal compliance falls far short of establishing a clear and predictable standard for balancing the different objectives involved. For example, in the case of interoperability or permission to install third-party applications, how much latitude should designated entities retain to conduct malware checks, and what security and confidentiality standards may be required of third parties? The ability to establish technical conditions for such access does not necessarily constitute an unjustified restriction on competition, as it is also a mechanism for protecting both the integrity of services and users themselves.
The legal uncertainty is clear, since these obligations will be enforced by a competition authority that lacks expertise in cybersecurity and data protection and has no track record of cooperation with the authorities responsible for these areas. The problem is compounded by the sanctions provided for in the bill: without a clear safeguard for legitimate protective measures, there is a risk that companies will be incentivized to prioritize formal compliance with interoperability and access obligations over applying stricter security and confidentiality standards.
On this point, the European DMA itself, which inspires Brazilian legislation, contains clear safeguards. The DMA expressly recognizes the possibility of adopting strictly necessary and proportionate measures to protect the integrity of gatekeepers’ services. Including a similar safeguard in Bill No. 4675/2025 would help reconcile the opening of markets with the security of digital infrastructure—which, indeed, often underpins essential services for the Brazilian population, such as financial and government systems.
The aim is not to subordinate competition policy to data protection, but to establish effective mechanisms through which cybersecurity can be preserved and the specialized data protection agency can contribute, from the relevant stages of the analysis onward, to identifying risks and regulatory alternatives. This would allow competition-related measures and the obligations discussed in the context of ex ante regulation to be designed in a manner consistent with protecting users’ rights.
This coordination necessarily requires strengthening other institutions, such as the National Cybersecurity Committee (CNCiber) and ANPD, neither of which has published any analysis of the potential impacts of Bill No. 4675, even though such an analysis would be essential. In ANPD’s case, without increased capacity to monitor complex markets and participate in relevant regulatory proceedings in a timely manner, cooperation may place additional demands on an authority already under pressure from multiple responsibilities, since in 2026 the agency assumed responsibilities beyond the LGPD, including the Internet Civil Rights Framework (Marco Civil da Internet) and the Digital Child and Adolescent Statute (ECA Digital). The effectiveness of digital regulation depends both on coordination among institutions and on the conditions that enable each institution to exercise its powers properly.