Several factors help explain this new approach, which runs counter to the Brazilian Ministry of Finance's 2024 assessment that CADE had been relatively ineffective in addressing competition issues in digital markets. First, CADE has developed greater expertise as an increasing number of cases involving digital services have come before the authority, whether in merger review proceedings or in investigations of allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Second, similar practices had already been examined in other jurisdictions. Third, the General Superintendence's (SG) use of interim measures intensified and accelerated the substantive discussion of these issues. Through the appeals filed by Apple and Meta against the interim measures, the cases reached CADE's Tribunal at an early stage, enabling it to formulate a preliminary assessment and identify sufficient elements to outline potential settlement alternatives. In the Apple case, these early indications enabled the company, through a collaborative process, to submit a proposal for a Cease-and-Desist Commitment Agreement (Termo de Compromisso de Cessação – TCC), relaxing its rules in a manner that addressed the concerns raised by the Tribunal while preserving critical aspects of operational security.

At the same time, two bills currently under consideration in the Chamber of Deputies propose markedly different approaches to competition regulation in digital markets. On the one hand, Bill No. 2,768/2022, as reflected in the latest substitute bill presented by Representative Any Ortiz in May 2026, proposes maintaining an ex post enforcement model focused on conduct that has already occurred, combined with a "fast-track" procedure designed to encourage settlements such as the one reached in the Apple case. On the other hand, Bill No. 4,675/2025 proposes a model under which CADE would assume functions closer to those of a regulatory agency by establishing ex ante rules and obligations applicable to certain digital services offered by large platforms, before any potentially anticompetitive conduct takes place.

While this legislative debate continues in Congress, CADE has also advanced its regulatory framework by implementing institutional improvements based on its experience in digital markets. Most recently, it adopted CADE Resolution No. 38/2026, which establishes governance rules for consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as procedural rules governing the payment and collection of fines, with the aim of providing greater legal certainty for settlement agreements. This initiative reflects the authority's commitment to negotiated solutions, which reduce litigation while allowing arrangements that reconcile competition policy with innovation.

Along the same lines, CADE intends to establish a specialized team to investigate technology companies, regardless of whether either legislative proposal is enacted, consistent with its broader institutional structure based on specialized divisions. Digital markets require technical expertise, institutional memory, familiarity with digital business models, effective screening capabilities, and speed in enforcement. The creation of a dedicated division, together with support from CADE's Department of Economic Studies (DEE), may provide an effective mechanism for ensuring both efficiency and high-quality analysis in this area.

The settlement reached in the Apple case, CADE's swift response in the Meta case, and the authority's ongoing institutional reorganization and regulatory initiatives suggest that the most effective, expeditious, and consensus-based approach to competition regulation in Brazil's digital markets lies within CADE itself, building on its own institutional experience and design. It is essential that these internal institutional improvements continue to be implemented, particularly in light of the uncertainty in Congress, where two bills proposing diametrically opposed approaches remain under consideration. It is still unclear whether CADE should be granted a broader regulatory mandate and, if so, what the appropriate scope of those new powers should be.

Sound regulation must be grounded in a careful assessment of which additional enforcement powers are truly necessary, when they should be exercised, and what safeguards should accompany them. At this stage, the most appropriate response to the challenges posed by digital platforms appears to be strengthening what already works, correcting what has proven ineffective, and resisting the temptation to fundamentally redesign a successful institution through the enactment of new legislation.